Much of everyday behavior involves serial decision-making, in which the outcome of 1 choice affects another. An example is setting rules for oneself: choosing a behavioral rule guides appropriate choices in the future. How the brain links decisions across time is poorly understood. Neural mechanisms could be studied in monkeys, as it is known that they can select and use behavioral rules, but existing psychophysical paradigms are poorly suited for the constraints of neurophysiology. Therefore, we designed a streamlined task that requires sequential, linked decisions, and trained 2 rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta) to perform it. The task features trial-by-trial consistency, visual stimuli, and eye movement responses to optimize it for simultaneous electrophysiological inquiry. In the first stage of each trial, the monkeys selected a rule or a rule was provided to them. In the second stage, they used the rule to discriminate between 2 test stimuli. Our hypotheses were that they could use self-selected rules and could deliberately select rules based on reinforcement history. We found that the monkeys were as proficient at using self-selected rules as instructed rules. Their preferences for selecting rules correlated with their performance in using them, consistent with systematic, rather than random, strategies for accomplishing the task. The results confirm and extend prior findings on rule selection in monkeys and establish a viable, experimentally flexible paradigm for studying the neural basis of serial decision-making.
Decisions are based on evidence but shaped by rules and context. Sometimes the rules and contextual factors are externally provided. The color of a traffic light, for example, affects how evidence (observation of nearby cars) is used to form a decision (whether to accelerate or brake). Often, however, rules and context are internally determined. For instance, one's decision to buy more fresh produce at a grocery store has implications for dinner choices later. Self-selecting a rule or principle for guiding subsequent behaviors is common in human experience.
Nonhuman primates, as well, can select and perform rules or tasks among multiple alternatives, opening up the potential for examination of neural mechanisms (Fujita, 2009; Perdue, Evans, Washburn, Rumbaugh, & Beran, 2014; Washburn, Hopkins, & Rumbaugh, 1991) . Crucially, Washburn et al. (1991) demonstrated that rhesus monkeys can maintain a selection bias toward task options across days, even when new task cues are introduced, suggesting that the bias represents a true preference for certain tasks. However, they did not directly examine the underlying causes of those preferences and how they relate to task performance. Additionally, in all prior studies the tasks used distinct stimulus-sets, preventing the study of cross-task interference. None of the tasks in prior work were designed for use in physiological studies, which benefit from quick event timing, precise stimulus control, and minimal response demands.
Here we describe a streamlined task for examining selfselected rule use in monkeys that features brief trials, visual stimuli, and eye movement responses, making it suitable for neural recordings. The task design allows for systematic analysis of many aspects of rule selection, such as the question of why monkeys select particular rules. When humans have the opportunity to switch rules, they preferentially repeat the same rule to avoid switching costs (Arrington & Logan, 2004) . Changes in relative difficulty of applying the rules, however, can lead to more switching behavior (Cohen, McClure, & Yu, 2007; Daw, O'Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006) . We tested two specific hypotheses: first, that even in our streamlined paradigm, monkeys are able to select rules and use them to make perceptual decisions; and second, that monkeys, like humans, bias their rule selection to balance the avoidance of switching costs with the preferential selection of rules that favor reward (based on reinforcement history).
Evidence from two monkeys trained to perform the new task supported both hypotheses: the monkeys selected rules and applied them to later decisions, and across trials they exhibited systematic biases in their rule selection as if tracking their success. The relative contributions of putative mechanisms to explain the behavior, such as rational selection versus associative learning, are amenable to study through modifications of the paradigm. The task described here thus offers an experimentally flexible, neurophysiologically compatible approach to expanding the study of decision-making to sequential, linked choice behavior.
Method

Subjects and Task
The subjects were two rhesus monkeys (Macaca mulatta), labeled "S" (male, 11 years old) and "M" (female, 8 years old). Each was implanted with a scleral search coil to monitor eye position at 0.1 deg. and 1 ms precision (Judge, Richmond, & Chu, 1980) . A plug for connecting to the eye coil and a post for head restraint during experiments were bound with acrylic and fixed to the skull with bone screws using aseptic techniques and general anesthesia (Sommer & Wurtz, 2000) . All procedures were approved by the Duke Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee. During experiments, a monkey sat in a primate chair (Crist Instrument Co., Hagerstown, MD) in a dimly lit room facing a tangent screen (Steward Filmscreen Corp., Torrance, CA) onto which visual stimuli were projected from a 60-Hz LCD projector (Hitachi). The REX real-time system (Hays, Richmond, & Optican, 1982) controlled the task and collected eye position data at 1 kHz. Every trial of the task included a rule-selection stage followed by a rule-implementation stage (see Figure 1) . The goal in the rule-selection stage (Figure 1 , left) was to establish the rule for selecting between decision targets in the rule-implementation stage (Figure 1, right) . We trained the monkeys to associate colored stimuli with two abstract behavioral rules: the size rule, R S , which meant "pick the smaller target," and the brightness rule, R B , which meant "pick the darker target." For Monkey S, a green stimulus represented R S and a red stimulus represented R B ; for Monkey M, the color-rule assignments were reversed. The sizes and brightnesses of the decision targets were set in a pilot study using Monkey S with the goal of equalizing difficulty levels (i.e., performance on each rule). The resulting size and brightness value distributions were then used for both monkeys during formal testing sessions, which commenced after they learned the rules and the color-rule associations. We assessed that monkeys learned the task when their accuracy stabilized and they could immediately respond appropriately to novel visual stimuli.
At the start of the rule-selection stage in every trial, a monkey fixated a central white spot for 400 -600 ms (randomized). Then, two colored, peripheral "rule" targets appeared. They could be different (one red, one green in "Self-Selected" trials) or the same (both red or both green in "Instructed" trials), as described in the next paragraph. The targets were always diametrically opposite from each other, with one in each visual hemifield, but the eccentricities and directions (relative to the horizontal median) could vary from 5 to 25 degrees and Ϯ 0 -60 degrees, respectively. Target locations varied from session-to-session but were constant within a session. Varying the locations discouraged spatial habits and accustomed the monkeys to presentation of stimuli over a wide range of space in preparation for neurophysiology (the locations of neuronal response fields can vary considerably). After the rule targets appeared, the monkey had to maintain fixation for 300 -500 ms. Then the central spot was extinguished, cueing the monkey to make a saccade to one of the rule targets and foveate it for at least 200 ms. In Self-Selected trials, the rule targets differed in color, so selection of a target established the rule for the ruleimplementation stage. In Instructed trials, the rule targets were the same color, so it did not matter which target was selected; the rule was imposed on the monkey. Thus everything was the same in Figure 1 . Task schematic. Each trial was divided into two stages. Left: Rule-selection stage. A monkey looked at a fixation spot and then two colored stimuli appeared in the periphery. Each color represented a learned, behavioral rule: R S (pick the smaller target) or R B (pick the darker target). In Self-Selected trials (top), the two stimuli were of different colors and thus corresponded to different rules from which the monkey could choose. In Instructed trials (bottom), the stimuli were the same color so only a single rule was possible. The monkey had to select one of the colored stimuli by making a saccade to it. After foveating it briefly, the monkey had to make a saccade back to the fixation spot. Right: Rule-implementation stage. Two new peripheral targets appeared, differing in their sizes and brightnesses. After a delay, the monkey had to select one of the targets with a saccade. If it picked the target concordant with the previously self-selected or instructed rule, it received reward. Shown is a successful R S trial. Orange circles represent eye position and orange arrows represent saccades. Stimuli not to scale; they are shown larger than in the experiment for clarity of illustration. This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
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Self-Selected and Instructed trials except that, in the former, the monkey selected the rule to use. If at any time during the ruleselection stage, the monkey broke fixation by more than 3 deg. prior to minimum duration times, made a saccade before cued to go, or failed to make a saccade, the trial was aborted, to be repeated later. Otherwise, the rule-selection stage ended with disappearance of the rule targets, reappearance of the central white spot, and a saccade back to it. The trial proceeded continuously to the rule-implementation stage. After the monkey fixated the central spot for 400 -600 ms, two square "decision" targets appeared 10 deg. to the left and right. These targets could vary both in their size and brightness (see "Decision Target Parameters" for details). After 500 -1000 ms, the central spot was extinguished and the monkey was required to make a saccade to one of the decision targets. If it selected the target consistent with the established rule (e.g., the smaller target when the rule was R S , "pick the smaller target"), the trial was correct and reward (0.25 mL water or juice) was delivered. If the monkey selected the incorrect target, no reward was delivered. If the monkey broke fixation or made a saccade to a nontarget location, the trial was aborted, and a brief time-out ensued before a new trial began.
Decision Target Parameters
On each trial, the sizes of the decision targets were independently drawn from identical discrete uniform distributions (sidelengths of 3, 3.5, or 4 deg.; also 4.5 deg. in some sessions). The brightnesses of the decision targets were also independently drawn from identical discrete uniform distributions (1, 5, or 15 cd/m 2 ; also 27 cd/m 2 in some sessions). Therefore, in a given session, the subjects were exposed to up to 4 2 ϭ 16 possible decision targets, 16 2 ϭ 256 possible pairs of decision targets, and 2 ϫ 256 ϭ 512 possible sets of decision targets and rule target combinations. This large number of stimulus combinations was designed to encourage the learning and use of abstract rules rather than specific stimulusresponse associations. The central fixation point had a side-length of 2 deg. and brightness of 27 cd/m 2 , and the screen background had a brightness of 0.1 cd/m 2 . For most analyses, we were interested in the differences in size or brightness (⌬S and ⌬B) between the targets rather than absolute sizes and brightnesses. Size and brightness scales have notably different ranges, and brightness perception is nonlinear, so we used arbitrary size units (SU) defined as the difference between the ordinal ranks of the sizes of the decision targets (and analogously for brightness units, BU). The differences therefore varied between 0 -3 SU for size and 0 -3 BU for brightness, allowing for direct comparison of difficulty across both rules using ordinal rankings.
Statistics
Parametric statistical tests were used except for tests involving RTs, which are typically skewed and therefore require nonparametric tests (e.g., Mann-Whitney U test). All results are based on p Ͻ .05 criterion with Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons. For effect-size measures, we report p 2 for ANOVAs and Cohen's d for t tests.
Results
Accuracy Using Selected Versus Instructed Rules
The two monkeys performed a total of 95 sessions of the rule selection task after training stabilized (Monkey S: 65 sessions; Monkey M: 30 sessions). Accuracy was quantified as the fraction of trials in which a monkey selected the correct target in the rule-implementation stage (see Figure 1 ) based on the rule established in the rule-selection stage: size rule R S or brightness rule R B . First, we tested whether accuracy exceeded chance levels (0.5) for each condition-by-rule interaction (n ϭ 4; Conditions: SelfSelected and Instructed; Rules: R S and R B ) in each monkey (n ϭ 2) with correction for the 8 comparisons. Both monkeys performed significantly greater than chance when using instructed rules ( 2 ϭ 0.009, p ϭ .611). Due to the two-alternative forced choice task design, it was not possible to determine the source of errors, for example, whether the monkey applied the correct rule incorrectly or the incorrect rule correctly.
We confirmed the accuracy results using the phi correlation test, a trial-by-trial measure that facilitates comparison across studies of serial decision-making (Kornell, Son, & Terrace, 2007; Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2011) . Phi correlations between the rule established in the first stage of the task and the rule used in the second stage were significant for both monkeys for both selected (Monkey S: ϭ 0. Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2011) .
Analyzing accuracy across sessions revealed tradeoffs in success at using the two rules ( Figure 2B ). On a daily basis, the monkeys' ability to perform the R B perceptual decision ("pick the darker stimulus") varied inversely with the ability to perform the R S decision ("pick the smaller stimulus"; This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
performed both rules well, their capabilities were dynamic and represented a balance: better than average performance on one rule came at the cost of worse performance on the other rule (implications addressed in "Discussion"). Reaction times varied little with condition or rule. We analyzed saccades to the rule target and to the decision target, correcting for the two comparisons (p Ͻ .025 criterion). Median RTs were not significantly different between Self-Selected and Instructed conditions for saccades made to either the rule targets ( This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. 
Factors Affecting Rule Selection
On Self-Selected trials, monkeys were free to choose either of the two rules. Despite attempts during training to equalize the difficulty of applying the rules to the later decision (see Method), both monkeys developed a small, significant bias in their rule selection (t test vs. 0. Comparing these biases with accuracy levels in Self-Selected trials (cf. Figure 2A , SS-R S and SS-R B data) demonstrated an apparent link: Monkey S preferentially selected R B and was also better at implementing R B , while Monkey M preferred R S and was better at implementing R S . We hypothesized that the monkeys selected rules systematically to optimize reward and dynamically adapted their preferences accordingly. A decision-maker trying to maximize reward should preferentially select the rule that is most likely to yield reward (i.e., the rule at which they perform better). The strength of this bias should track the relative likelihoods of reward for each rule, which can be quantified as the log-odds of reward L ϭ log 10 (pR B /pR S ), where pR B and pR S are the accuracies (probability correct) using R B and R S , respectively (one can also use L ϭ pR B -pR S ; results are qualitatively the same). To test the hypothesis, we plotted rule selection bias against log-odds of reward for each session ( Figure 2C) Alternative explanations for the rule selection biases include a buildup in preference for a rule across sessions (as a monkey improves at using it) or dependence on log-odds of reward on the prior day rather than the current day. To test these explanations, we ran a linear regression that quantified the relationships between session number, the prior day's log-odds of reward, and rule selection biases on the current day. Both monkeys exhibited significant effects of session number (␤ 1 ) and/or the prior day's log-odds of reward (␤ 2 ) on rule selection bias (Monkey S: Pearson's r ϭ . 
Factors Affecting Accuracy
Congruency effects. In the second stage of our task, only the size or brightness difference between the targets was relevant, depending on the rule that was in effect. Decision-making is often affected by irrelevant stimulus features as well, however (e.g., Kumano, Suda, & Uka, 2016; Rogers & Monsell, 1995) . Even when the brightness rule (R B ) was in effect, for example, it could be that the perceptual decision was influenced by the size difference, especially if the brightness difference was small but the size difference was large. We therefore analyzed whether accuracy on our task was influenced by such congruency effects. To quantify congruency, we looked at the strength (i.e., difficulty) of the relevant stimulus features (0 -3 SU or BU, depending on rule; see Methods) and both the magnitude and sign of the irrelevant stimulus features (Ϫ3 -ϩ3 SU or BU, where positive numbers denote congruent combinations and negative numbers denote incongruent combinations). We focused on trials in which using the rule was more or less difficult as implied by smaller or larger differences in the relevant features of the two targets (⌬S ϭ 1 or 2, respectively, in R S trials, and ⌬B ϭ 1 or 2 in R B trials). We quantified congruency effects as mean accuracy on trials with congruent target combinations minus mean accuracy on trials with incongruent target combinations. Congruency effects are positive when accuracy is higher for congruent versus incongruent target combinations.
We found robust congruency effects ( Figure 2D ), with both monkeys showing a Ͼ40% change in accuracy on congruent versus incongruent trials (0.419 for Monkey S, 0.414 for Monkey M). For simplicity of visualization, Figure 2D displays data pooled from both monkeys and shows raw accuracy as a function of the difficulty and congruency of the target combination (congruent combinations are toward the right and incongruent combinations are toward the left of the graph). Statistical analyses were performed for each monkey individually using a three-way repeatedmeasures ANOVA on congruency effects with factors of difficulty of the relevant discrimination, difficulty of the irrelevant discrimination, and rule. Congruency effects depended robustly on the difficulty of the relevant discrimination, such that more difficult discriminations were subject to more interference from the irrelevant stimulus feature (main effect of relevant difficulty on congruency effects: F [1, 64] Figure 2D as the dashed lines ("Hard": ⌬S or ⌬B ϭ 1) shifted below the respective solid lines ("Easy": ⌬S or ⌬B ϭ 2). We also found that congruency effects were larger when the degree of the irrelevant stimulus feature was large (main effect of irrelevant difficulty on congruency effects: F [1, 64] Figure 2B ) is suggestive of switching costs. Therefore, we performed trial-by-trial analyses to determine if the monkeys exhibited switching costs, defined as the average accuracy on "stay" trials minus the average accuracy on "switch" trials. First, we performed logistic regression to determine the effect of rule switching on trial accuracy while controlling for the current rule in effect. Across sessions, accuracy on the current trial was significantly higher when the rule on the previous trial was the same as the rule on the current trial for Monkey S (mean logistic regression coefficient, ␤ log , was 0.089; t [64] To test if switching costs strengthen after repeated instances of a rule, we identified streaks of consecutive trials with the same rule and looked at accuracy on the subsequent trial as a function of whether the rule on that trial was the same as the rule during the streak. Within each session, we performed linear regression to see if there was a relationship between streak length and the switching cost after a streak of that length. We found that, across sessions, switching costs increased as streak length increased for Monkey S (mean linear regression coefficient, ␤ lin , was 1.50, t[64] 
Discussion
In our serial decision-making task, monkeys had to set a behavioral context (select a rule) and then make a visual decision within that context (apply the rule). Two monkeys performed the task well, regardless of whether rules were selected or instructed. When allowed to select a rule, the monkeys made selections consistent with the goal of reward maximization. The data support our hypotheses that monkeys can select and apply rules using deliberate, modifiable decisions.
By confirming and extending similar work on serial decisionmaking that used more complex approaches (e.g., Washburn et al., 1991) , the results suggest that our visual-saccadic paradigm provides a sound basis for moving toward neural studies of the subject. It should be recognized, however, that the simplified task design has its limitations. Most notably, the exact mechanisms of rule selection, and the causes of rule application errors, can be inferred but not explicitly demonstrated. Multiple processes could contribute to the effects we found. The evidence supports rational rule selection and implementation but does not rule out operations such as associative learning. Recent work in humans (Egner, 2014) , for example, suggests that "bottom-up" stimulus-response associations work in concert with "top-down" executive control to generate congruency effects (discussed further below). It would be remarkable if our monkeys relied substantially on associative learning, however, given that they faced 512 randomized combinations of rule and decision targets. The potential contribution of associative versus rule-based learning could be examined further by using infinite combinations of decision targets (continuously graded, nonrepeated sizes and brightnesses). We consider the task to be a core paradigm with many such possibilities for modification.
Rule Implementation and Psychophysics
Our results build on prior studies of rule selection in monkeys in two key ways. First, we demonstrated that rule preference across days is dynamic and tied to day-to-day fluctuations in accuracy on each of the rule options. Second, by utilizing the same stimulus-set for both rules, we ensured that the monkeys were truly using the selected rule rather than responding appropriately to distinct stimulus-sets. In all prior studies of rule selection in monkeys, each rule or task option used different stimuli, meaning that (a) the stimulus-set was perfectly indicative of the task to be performed, and (b) it was impossible for the monkeys to mistakenly perform an unselected task (Fujita, 2009; Perdue et al., 2014; Washburn et al., 1991) . In our task, the stimuli shown during the ruleimplementation stage did not indicate the rule that had been selected (forcing the monkeys to remember the selected rule), and it was possible for monkeys to mistakenly perform an unselected rule. Our task was not designed, however, to distinguish "withinrule" errors (i.e., misperceiving the relative sizes or brightnesses of the target) from "between-rule" errors (i.e., performing the unselected rule instead of the selected one).
Consistent with prior demonstrations of perceived control (Burger, 1987) , Washburn et al. (1991) found that task performance was typically higher when a monkey selected a task than when it was instructed. In contrast, we found no main effects of selection versus instruction on accuracy. A possible explanation is that performance was at a ceiling and could not benefit from perceived control. It could also be that assessing accuracy within each rule was not an appropriate metric: phi correlations, a ruleagnostic measure of performance, were significantly higher for selected versus instructed rules for one monkey (and marginally significant for the other).
Congruency effects, such as the Stroop effect (Macleod, 1991) , have been demonstrated in humans performing a wide variety of different tasks. Typically, these effects are manifest as an increase in RT for incongruent versus congruent target combinations, and error rates (on both congruent and incongruent trials) are often less than 10% (cf. Rogers & Monsell, 1995, Figure 2) . One of our monkeys exhibited the expected RT effects, and both exhibited robust and large effects on accuracy. Specifically, while accuracy on congruent trials approached 100%, accuracy on incongruent trials was often at or below chance for both monkeys, suggesting that macaques are less able than humans to ignore irrelevant target information. In agreement with this conclusion, previous studies have compared congruency costs between monkeys and humans, and found them to be significantly greater in monkeys (Stoet & This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly. Snyder, 2003; Washburn, 1994) . Two more recent studies have also found congruency effects in monkeys (Kumano et al., 2016; Mante, Sussillo, Shenoy, & Newsome, 2013) . In all of these studies, notable congruency effects were found, but at magnitudes smaller than in our experiment. A possible explanation is that, in all of the prior studies, the two stimulus dimensions (symbolic numerals vs. numerosity in Washburn, 1994 ; color vs. spatial orientation in Stoet & Snyder, 2003 ; color vs. motion direction in Mante et al., 2013 ; depth vs. motion direction in Kumano et al., 2016) were unlikely to directly interact or interfere. In contrast, stimulus size and brightness can interact very strongly. Stimulus size can impact our perception of stimulus brightness, and vice versa (Osaka, 1975; Over, 1962) . Overall, we expect that the difference in the magnitude of congruency effects between our study and previous studies (in both monkeys and humans) is largely caused by this potential for perceptual interference between our two stimulus dimensions. In contrast, the switching costs we found were less robust than what is often reported for humans (Altmann, 2004; Meiran, 1996; Sudevan & Taylor, 1987) . This is consistent with evidence that monkeys do not show switching costs when switches are cued, unpredictable, and frequent (Avdagic, Jensen, Altschul, & Terrace, 2014; Stoet & Snyder, 2003) , although one study reported comparable switching costs in monkeys and humans (Caselli & Chelazzi, 2011) . To our knowledge, none of the previous studies in monkeys specifically examined whether switching costs increase or appear when the switch comes after multiple trials of the same rule or task. One possible explanation of our results is that, when switches are frequent and unpredictable, monkeys do not preferentially prepare for either task during the intertrial interval, and thus do not show simple switching costs. However, when the same rule or task is repeated over a series of trials, switching costs do emerge, suggesting that monkeys may have small switching costs that additively interact during a streak of similar trials. Notably, while only Monkey S showed significant switching costs, Monkey M showed comparable effect sizes that were statistically insignificant but based on fewer sessions (30 for Monkey M; 65 for Monkey S).
Interestingly, despite experiencing much more training than humans, the monkeys never reached the same levels of accuracy as humans performing comparable tasks (including when humans must implicitly learn the task rules; Smith, Beran, Crossley, Boomer, & Ashby, 2010) . This may reflect a species difference in cognitive ability. Both monkeys exhibited a systematic tradeoff in accuracy between the two rules ( Figure 2B ), suggesting that they were operating at the upper limits of their abilities. A complementary potential explanation is that the monkeys were satisfied with their moderate reward rates, and thus did not increase accuracy further at the cost of greater effort. Regardless of the cause, the increased number of errors overall allowed us to look systematically at how error rates change over various task conditions, and this will be particularly useful for future comparisons of neural data across task conditions. Furthermore, the elevated error rates suggest that, in contrast to many studies of nonhuman animal behavior, our monkeys were not overtrained or simply performing learned stimulus-response associations.
Roadmap for Neurophysiological Applications
The streamlined task that we developed and validated should facilitate neural studies of serial decision-making. One brain area of interest was identified using a related task, in which monkeys performed a visual detection and then wagered on whether they were correct (Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2011) . Neural signals that linked the decisions were found in an area of frontal cortex, the supplementary eye field (SEF; Middlebrooks & Sommer, 2012) .
